) (discretionary satellite sites); id. § 21-11-1, -3 (dual registration required in some municipalities) ; Mo. ANN. S'rAT. § 115.143(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987 ) (discretionary appointment of deputy registrars); id. § 115.143(5) (discretionary satellite sites); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-208 (1984) (discretionary appointment of deputy registrars); id. 10. In one line of cases plaintiffs successfully asserted the right of free speech in a public forum, enabling already deputized registrars to enter welfare and unemployment offices for the purpose of signing up registrants. See, e.g., Project Vote v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 578 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Another line of cases found plaintiffs to have a valid freedom of association claim when a registrar appointed deputies only from certain organizations but not from the plaintiff's organization. See, e.g., Project Vote v. Distefano, No. 84-03228 (1st Cir. June 27, 1984) (temporary restraining order). In such cases courts have ordered registrars to establish an objective, non-partisan basis for selecting deputies. Other cases resulted in settlements in which states agreed to take steps to facilitate registration or to conduct a study of outreach alternatives. The state of Michgan agreed to a settlement in August 1985 prohibiting discrimination in the appointment of deputy registrars. Louisiana agreed in a settlement in 1986 to conduct a study of outreach methods in districts with the greatest disparity between black and white registration rates. A settlement was reached in Georgia in 1986 under which each county was to submit plans for registration efforts. See The Human Serve Campaign, Litigating the Right To Register and To Cast a Ballot: A Summary of Current Cases and encouraging, have failed to resolve the two key questions addressed in this Note: First, under what circumstances is any pre-election day registration requirement constitutionally permissible; and second, when pre-election day registration is allowable, is the state obliged to minimize the burden the registration obstacle imposes on the individual?
This Note argues that registration is a per se restriction of the right to vote. First, it demonstrates that the right to cast a ballot in general purpose elections is fundamental. Second, it argues that the imposition of any registration prerequisite constitutes "any restriction" on this fundamental right. Third, applying strict scrutiny analysis, the Note examines possible state interests that might justify a voter' registration requirement. Upon finding fraud prevention to be the only possible state interest reaching "compelling" stature, it examines the extent to which states actually use registration as a means to prevent fraud. The Note then proposes a method for applying least restrictive means analysis in the registration context.
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT To VOTE IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION

CLAUSE
The "fundamental rights" tier of the equal protection clause calls for application of strict scrutiny when a restriction is placed on the exercise of a fundamental right. 11 The restriction, regardless of the basis of the classification, will be upheld only when it is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest. 12 Approaches (Oct. 1986) (photo. reprint on file with author). For further discussion of facilitative state practices, see infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
11. Strict scrutiny is also applied to discrimination on the basis of "suspect classifications" such as race, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), national ancestry, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) , and alienage, see, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) . With suspect classifications, in contrast to fundamental rights, it is the nature of the classification, not the nature of the activity, that triggers strict scrutiny. To bring suit claiming discrimination against a suspect class when the legislation is facially neutral, plaintiff must establish that the purpose of the legislation was at least partially motivated by an illicit classification, such as race. Village Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 655 n.15 (1966) (narrowly tailored means required when fundamental rights substantive, providing an entitlement to all qualified voters to be free from obstacles to casting a ballot, or merely a right of equal access. The conclusion that the right should be deemed substantive is the logical convergence of three strands of American jurisprudence: first, the substantive manner in which fundamental rights have been interpreted in the equal protection clause; second, the applicability of heightened judicial scrutiny to legislation concerning "process defects;" and third, the special treatment in practice accorded individual voting rights under the Constitution, especially since Reynolds v. Sims." 6
The Fundamental Rights Doctrine
The notion that there are rights implicit in the equal protection clause of the Constitution only emerged in 1942 with Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.
1 7 Since then the Supreme Court has declared a number of rights to be fundamental under the equal protection clause," 8 and the list of rights courts consider fundamental is constantly evolving. 19 Fundamental rights analysis looks to the nature of the activity, not the basis of the classification." 0 Strict scrutiny is triggered by an infringement on a substantive entitlement, implicit or explicit in the Constitution. 2 structure of fundamental rights equal protection analysis does require that a "classification" impose a restriction on the fundamental right. The registration requirement produces such a classification; the class of persons harmed by the registration requirement consists of those who on election day would like to cast a ballot and are otherwise eligible but are blocked from doing so for not having registered. 22 However, a restriction on a fundamental right need not disadvantage one definable group relative to another. 2 " Moreover, the purpose of the classification is not material; it is not necessary to demonstrate an intent to obstruct access of exactly those who do not register. 24 
Process Defects
Courts have recognized the importance of applying heightened scrutiny to legislation that impedes the democratic political processes necessary to challenge the harmful legislation. In its famous footnote in Carolene Products, the Court said: "[Liegislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
' 2 5 22. The pre-election day registration requirement erects two sorts of barriers: first, by requiring an individual to expend additional time and effort before being eligible to vote, and second, by imposing an absolute barrier before persons who become aware of their preference for a specific candidate only after the registration deadline has passed.
23. Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 1180 n.78 ("equal protection may confer protection of substantive rights no matter how 'equally' the right is invaded"); see also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (injury found despite inability to pinpoint exact voters harmed); Harper, 383 U.S. at 668 (implying that poll tax burdened all voters, not just those unable to pay).
It has been argued that the fundamental rights strand of equal protection analysis is not properly an equal protection issue since it grants substantive, not just relative rights, and that matters such as voting should instead be deemed quasi-fundamental rights, enforced independently of the equal protection clause. See Perry, supra note 20, at 1077, 1081. Although this alternative approach could be developed, it is not necessary to step out of equal protection analysis to find a substantive right to vote because the Supreme Court has already established the framework for substantive fundamental rights analysis within the equal protection clause. Both courts and commentators have recognized that the high importance of voting stems from its centrality to the political process. As the Supreme Court observed over a century ago, voting is "a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights." 2 More recently, in elaborating on the process defect argument, Dean John Hart Ely noted that "unblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage. "27 Voter registration laws fall squarely within the realm of process defects because elected officials have no incentive to be responsive to persons who are unable to vote. 2 Legislators have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo-that is, in ensuring that those who voted them into office will continue to be the only voters. 9
Voting Rights Cases
The Supreme Court has addressed the nature of the individual's right to vote in the context of voter qualification, reapportionment, and candidate ballot access cases. The claim that the right to vote is just a matter of (1982) . Moreover, the court would just be setting in motion a procedural change, not attempting to reconstruct the outcome that would have emerged in the legislative process absent the registration obstacle. One criticism of a more interventionist interpretation of the Carolene Products doctrine is that any effort to reconstruct a "fair" political process and predict the outcomes it would have favored absent the obstructive legislation would be of staggering complexity. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715, 724-28, 740 (1985) . Still, arguably, the process defects claim can be asserted beyond the procedural issue present in this case, such as to protect powerless minorities from hostile substantive legislation. See Cover, The Origins ofJudicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982) . Removing the registration requirement simply frees the qualified electorate to participate on election day, enabling the democratic process to function unimpeded. equal access, requiring only that the classification in question not discriminate among definable real life populations, interprets too narrowly the qualification and reapportionment cases. Many of the voter qualifications/ regulations found unconstitutional in the past were indeed facially discriminatory along such lines as wealth," race, 3 " occupation, 32 property ownership, 33 or geography. 4 However, in these cases the Court has generally discussed both the right of equal access and a broader, more substantive, right to vote. 3 5
The one-person, one-vote rule laid down in Reynolds v. Sims, 36 a state reapportionment case, has both absolute and relative dimensions. While each qualified voter holds an entitlement to no more and no less than any other voter, she also has a positive entitlement to one vote per se. 37 Voter qualification cases similarly address both relative and absolute rights. While the Court in Harper characterized the $1.50 poll tax as a "classification" drawn along lines inconsistent with the equal protection clause, 3 " it found it unnecessary to identify the particular segment of the population harmed by the "classification." 3 9 The focus was on the base rights conferred on the entire potential electorate. By striking down the tax as applied to the entire electorate, not just the class of persons unable 36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37. "As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system." Id. at 562. "To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen." Id. at 567
For an interpretation of Reynolds as providing a substantive, not just a relative, right to vote, see [T] he right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.").
to pay, the Court suggested that all persons had a base entitlement not to have their right to vote conditioned on payment of a poll tax. 4 
"
In Dunn, 41 which overruled a durational residency requirement, the Court once again relied implicitly on both absolute and relative characterizations of the right to vote. The Court asserted the applicability of heightened scrutiny both when participation in elections "on an equal basis" ' 42 is denied, and when exercise of the right to vote is "conditioned" 4 or "restricted." 4 4 The latter characterization suggests a base entitlement of all qualified voters.
States do have the power under the Constitution to set voter qualifications, 45 thereby defining the group of persons with this base entitlement to vote on election day. However, "in an election of general interest, [qualification] restrictions on the franchise other than residence, age, and citizenship" are subject to heightened scrutiny. 4 6 Candidate ballot access cases have relied on the right to vote as one justification 47 for applying heightened scrutiny 48 to ballot access restrictions. The right to vote relied on in candidate cases cannot be characterized as merely one of equal treatment since the precise voters who are harmed by a ballot access restriction cannot be pinpointed, 49 and in fact no conceivable remedy in candidate cases has the impact of "equalizing" voter strength. Having another candidate on the ballot does shift the bal- ance, increasing the potential effectiveness of votes for the new candidate on the ballot, but it does not "equalize" effectiveness. Candidate cases thus do not even have the equal access component.
B. Any Restriction on the Right To Vote Triggers Strict Scrutiny
Candidate ballot access cases and reapportionment cases, as discusssed above, address the scope of the right to cast an effective ballot. 50 However, consideration of the effectiveness of the ballot would be meaningless unless the qualified voter is able to cast a ballot unencumbered in the first place.
One must consider what level of infringement on this right is sufficient encumbrance to trigger strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has not established one threshold of harm at which strict scrutiny is triggered for all fundamental rights. The "any restriction" standard applied in voting cases is thus decisive here. This standard is consistent with the nature of voting, an unconditional fundamental right.
Fundamental Rights Generally
In right to travel cases, for instance, strict scrutiny is applied when the right is "penalized.
'51 In freedom of association 52 and right to privacy 53 cases the Court has required varying degrees of burden according to the fundamental right at issue, before applying heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has never defined the parameters of these standards, 5 nor suggested that their applicability extends beyond the particular fundamental right in question.
A key factor distinguishing the voter registration context from a fundamental right protected only from "unduly burdensome interference" is the 50 nature of the state interest involved. Courts have at times appeared to anticipate the existence of state interests competing directly with the exercise of a fundamental right at the stage of determining the threshold at which strict scrutiny will be triggered. The higher threshold acts as an implicit balancing test in cases where exercise of the individual right and pursuit of the state interest are in direct contradiction, and thus avail themselves of no alternative, less restrictive means by which they could be concurrently pursued. The variant standard that results can be understood by comparing judicial treatment of the unconditional right to travel with the right to have an abortion free from "undue" interference. 5 " The right to an abortion is "conditional" because the state's potential interest in childbirth, under current medical technology, 6 is inextricably intertwined with exercise of the right to an abortion. The two conflicting interests are implicitly balanced by requiring a higher threshold of interference with the right to an abortion than would be applicable to an "unconditional" right, before applying heightened scrutiny. In contrast, the state cannot have a valid interest in deterring a person from exercising the right to travel. 57 Thus, it is not an "infringement" for the state to provide economic incentives to encourage the woman to opt for childbirth rather than to exercise her right to an abortion, while it would be an "infringement" for the state to provide economic incentives that distinguish between new arrivals and long time residents in the state, discouraging travel.
Voting is more aligned with free speech and travel as an unconditional right, requiring a lower threshold of injury before applying strict scrutiny. The state's only potentially valid compelling interest in support of the voter registration requirement, fraud prevention, 58 aims to prevent unqualified votes from being counted, not to prevent qualified voters from voting. Every individual who meets the age, residency, citizenship and competency requirements, and who is blocked from voting by the registration requirement, has lost a fundamental right for the sake of a collateral matter, fraud prevention.
Finally, in determining the applicable standard, courts have drawn a 55. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (woman's right to protection from "unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy ... implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds").
56. In theory, the state's interest in childbirth need not conflict directly with the woman's right to an abortion. If medical technology reached the point where the woman could stop her pregnancy while not interfering with the development of the fetus outside her womb, then the two interests could be pursued concurrently. Since medical technology has not yet reached that point, the law has needed to reconcile the conflicting interests. distinction between removing state-imposed obstacles and undertaking "affirmative" steps. State-imposed obstacles to fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause while the state's failure to extend a privilege, as an "affirmative" step, need only meet the rationality test. 5 " Arguably, as long as the infringement stems from state action, the obstacle would be subject to strict scrutiny even if some persons would be able, with effort, to surmount it. 60 Since any form of pre-election day registration is a state-imposed barrier encumbering the right to vote, no level of "effort" a state exerts to ease the obstacle renders a registration requirement an affirmative aid to the right to vote. States that use mail registration, deputy registrars, satellite registration sites, and extended office hours merely make it easier to overcome the state-imposed registration requirement. In such cases, the state has done nothing affirmatively to induce the individual to exercise the right to vote.
The Voting Context
In reapportionment, voter qualification, and candidate ballot access cases, the Supreme Court has affirmed that "any restriction" on the right to vote triggers heightened scrutiny. The Court in Reynolds first established the "any restriction" standard. "Affirmative" legislation is often justified by the state's interest in taking legislative reform "one step at a time." See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466-68 (1981) ("affirmative" legislation may be taken "one step at a time" for budgetary reasons); McDonald, 394 U.S. at 809 ("affirmative" action may proceed one step at a time according to which issue is "most acute to the legislative mind"). Since fiscal constraints are not a compelling interest, see infra note 110 and accompanying text, this rationale has not been applied and cannot be justified under strict scrutiny, when fundamental rights or "suspect classifications" are infringed. Congressional reapportionment cases provide the best factual context for pinpointing the minimal level of injury sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, because district sizes can be changed to conform to a virtually infinite scale of possibilities. 6 4 Qualification cases provide a less instructive basis of comparison for ascertaining that threshold level of harm because of the individualized factual circumstances in which they arise. 6 5 In candidate cases, the applicable standard is distinct because the right to vote arises only indirectly, and within the framework of the conditional "right" of ballot access. 6 Thus, the level of injury there required to invoke strict scrutiny is not appropriate in the registration context. 7 added).
62 (1983) ("Our primary concern is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions 'to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose.'" (quoting Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143)); Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) ("By limiting the choices available to voters, the State impairs the voters' ability to express their political preferences."). While the right to vote is unconditional, the "right" to ballot access is conditioned by the state's valid interest in orderly elections. That is, the state has an interest in providing access only for candidates with some modicum of voter support and can provide a narrowly-tailored obstacle to ballot access as a means. The theory is that while giving a candidate ballot access may benefit her supporters, the confusion engendered by a crowded ballot may concurrently impose costs on other voters. In addition, the electoral process as a whole may be disrupted to the extent it becomes harder to pinpoint one candidate who is the choice of the majority. The nature of this state interest in ballot access cases suggests that the threshold of harm which the candidate's supporters must suffer in order to trigger strict scrutiny would logically be higher than that necessary to challenge registration, the abolition of which would impose no costs on other voters, in order to equalize the net injury incurred in both cases. The higher threshold of harm required before applying strict scrutiny in ballot access cases can be analogized to the higher threshold the Court has required regarding the conditional right to an abortion. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. In both cases the state has an interest directly contrary to exercise of the individual "right," necessitating implicit balancing of the competing interests. Thus, while Bullock reaffirmed the holding in Harper that "the placing of even a minimal price on the exercise of the right to vote" was not permissible, Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142, consideration of the derivative and conditioning factors
The standard applied in congressional reapportionment cases, that no population variation is permissible which could "practicably" be avoided, has required the equivalent of the "least restrictive means" of redistricting. In these cases, the Supreme Court has not tolerated even de minimis population variations among districts unless the state can demonstrate a legitimate objective. 6 " Karcher v. Daggett, 6 " the Supreme Court's most recent congressional reapportionment case, involved a districting plan in which the average variation from perfectly equal districts was just 0.1384%,70 less than the probable error in census figures. The Court held that the plan violated the one-person, one-vote rule. Plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating that alternative districting plans with smaller population variations were available, while defendants failed to justify the variation as necessary to achieve a legitimate goal.
7 ' Thus, a very minimal variation in population was sufficient injury to warrant requiring implementation of a less restrictive plan.
II. APPLYING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS TO REGISTRATION
Registration is a classification that distinguishes between qualified persons who can and cannot cast a ballot on election day, according to whether they surmounted an obstacle, possibly weeks before the election. It is the state-imposed obstacle in the form of registration, not simply individual volition, that hinders exercise of the right. The registration requireis necessary in ballot access cases. Id. at 143 ("Not every limitation or incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of review.").
68 ment infringes the individual's right to vote at least as much as does a districting plan that dilutes the individual's vote a fraction of one percent.
A. Registration Constitutes "Any Restriction" on the Right To Vote
Logically, Pre-Election Day Registration Is Burdensome
By definition, having a pre-election day registration requirement is more restrictive than leaving the right unencumbered. An unregistered, would-be voter who becomes aware of her interest in a given election only after the registration deadline has passed is blocked from exercising her right to cast a ballot on election day. Thus, any pre-election day registration requirement logically is a restriction on the right to vote and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
The level of scrutiny should not vary according to the permissiveness of a state's current registration practices because registration itself is a restriction sufficient to warrant strict scrutiny. Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that, in her particular fact situation, registration is a substantial hurdle, before applying strict scrutiny, would be inappropriate since this amounts to looking at the merits of the claim in order to set the standard of review. 2 The only court decision to address the question of the threshold at which strict scrutiny is triggered in the registration context, Coalition for Sensible and Humane Solutions v. Wamser, 7 3 took this erroneous approach. The court in Coalition did not dispute that there is a substantive right to vote.' 4 However, it found the rationality test applicable upon first concluding that the plaintiff had sufficient opportunities to register. The Coalition court incorrectly relied upon McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners 75 for the principle that the "standard of rationality, not compelling state interest, applies when voting procedures do not absolutely preclude individuals from voting. ' " 7 6 Actually, the court in McDonald recognized the position taken in Harper that "because of the overriding importance of voting rights, classifications 'which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.' "7 Because the 72. The question whether sufficient registration opportunities exist is more appropriately addressed at the stage of evaluating whether the means used are the least restrictive. Depending on the degree to which the state is actually using registration as a means to prevent fraud, some state statutes might end up passing as the least restrictive means. An alternative reading of McDonald is that the court drew a distinction between the "right to vote" and the "right to vote conveniently," finding strict scrutiny applicable to the former but not the latter. The court in Coalition followed this interpretation of McDonald in plaintiffs in that case, pretrial detainees, apparently did not allege that the state restricted their right to vote (claiming instead a right of equal access to a particular form of voting, by absentee ballot), strict scrutiny was not mandated. The analysis developed here is fully consistent with McDonald in that plaintiffs would be directly challenging the restriction-registration-rather than insisting on the right to be registered in a specific manner.
Statistical Studies
Statistics substantiate the conclusion that registration constitutes "any restriction" on the right to vote. Voter participation rates in the United States declined significantly as states began to introduce personal registration requirements, toward the end of the nineteenth century. 78 Moreover, the registration rates in the states with the least-restrictive registration procedures are significantly higher than the national average, while turnconcluding that an infringement of the right to vote must be of some substance before strict scrutiny is triggered.
This Note argues that such an interpretation does not necessarily follow from the language in out as a percentage of registered voters in those states differs little from the national average." One study concluded that, if all states followed the registration practices of the most permissive states, turnout would increase by over nine percent. 8 0 These statistics suggest that registration poses a very real barrier to the right to vote, and that if this barrier were removed, more eligible persons would actually exercise their right to cast a ballot on election day.
Evolving Standards of Equal Protection
The Supreme Court's interpretation of equal protection has changed through time." 1 In the voting rights context, earlier court cases and federal legislation had to tackle voting prerequisites that posed more blatant barriers to electoral participation, such as poll taxes, 8 2 literacy tests, 3 grandfather clauses, 4 and durational residency requirements.
8 5 The time has come for our equal protection jurisprudence to recognize that the practice of registration, while more subtle than these other devices, nonetheless places a very real restriction on the fundamental right to vote.
B. Possible State Interests in Registration
Once the plaintiff has established that "any restriction" on the right to vote is present, thereby triggering strict scrutiny, the state must prove that the registration requirement is the least restrictive means of serving a compelling state interest. 8 8
The
A state might assert either "qualification" or "regulatory" interests in registration. Qualification interests can be conceptualized as those which further, in their own right, the intelligent use of the ballot, 7 while regulations concern maintenance of the integrity of the electoral process. 8 8
Registration Cannot Rationally Serve as a Voter Qualification
No state interest in registration as a voter qualification would be permissible since registration has no rational relation to the intelligent use of the ballot. 8 " The fact that an individual registered at some point in time bears no relation to the likelihood that she will cast an informed, rational ballot on election day. Furthermore, the state's interest in qualification can extend only to promotion of the intelligent use of the ballot. Registration as a means of selecting out an electorate more generally dedicated to the political process, rather than just interested in a particular election, would not therefore pass even the rational basis test.
Moreover, registration cannot be narrowly tailored to tap a more interested, informed electorate. Even if this were a compelling state interest, 90 the registration process, by its nature, is both over-and under-inclusive. Not only does registration block access to voting by citizens who become informed and interested after the registration deadline, it allows for inclu- outcome undoubtedly affects all citizens, and thus, until election day any citizen has the potential of becoming interested in the issues and candidates." 1 Certainly the behavior of candidates and pollsters in the weeks prior to an election suggests that they do not believe that either the citizens' awareness of the issues or their preference for candidates is frozen once the registration deadline has passed. The information flow concerning issues and candidates peaks in the weeks and even days before the election, often after the registration deadline has passed.
The Compelling State Interest in Preventing Voter Fraud
Historically, the most common justification given for the registration requirement has been prevention of voter fraud. 92 Plainly, fraud prevention is a compelling state interest. States do have an interest in assuring that only persons meeting the residency, age, competency and citizenship qualifications vote, and do so only once. However, the legitimacy of a state's assertion that registration serves to prevent voter fraud hinges on whether the state is actually using registration for that purpose. 9 3 Theoretically, pre-election day registration provides the state with time to verify that each registrant actually has a residence at the address indicated and is claiming no more than one address as a voting base. There are two types of verification mechanisms that could systematically make use of the time interval between a registration cut-off date and election day. First, states could compare both interstate and intrastate records to verify that no individual with the same identification information has registered to vote at more than one location. For example, dual registration by students living away from their permanent residences, and farmers finding temporary employment in the city could be identified by comparing registration records among different jurisdictions. 94 Second, by sending non- 94. Actually, what fraud does result through isolated instances of farmers and students casting ballots in two jurisdictions may have only an inconsequential, random effect on the election outcome anyway. The minor impact of isolated votes cast for diverse candidates contrasts with the greater threat posed by a systematic effort to inundate a jurisdiction with fraudulent votes for a particular forwardable postcards to all registrants, or checking registrant data against utility company and telephone records, authorities could identify, prior to election day, persons registering with fraudulent addresses.
In practice, states vary in the degree to which they implement preelection day fraud detection methods. No state routinely checks its registration records against those of other states. 5 Only when a new registrant admits to having previously registered elsewhere is it common for notice to be sent to the previous jurisdiction, directing cancellation of her registration there. 96 Some states do keep central computerized files enabling them to identify individuals who provided the same name, birthdate, and social security number for more than one address within the state. 97 However, since many states do not require identification upon registering," an individual intent upon committing fraud could easily circumvent this intrastate checking mechanism by supplying different names and birthdates for different alleged addresses.
By sending out non-forwardable postcards far enough in advance of the election such that undeliverable cards are returned to the Election Commission before election day, election officials could spot registrants providing false addresses. In practice, even among those states that do send out non-forwardable postcards, 99 the status of the registrant whose postcard is returned varies. Some states simply allow the registrant to vote as usual despite the alert that the registrant's data may have been false. 1 (Dec. 4, 1986) . Fraudulent registrants, therefore, will not be caught through the postcards sent out. The Kentucky election statute only mentions purging registrants based on the county board's own knowledge. Ky. Rtv. S'rAT. ANN. § 116.125 (Supp. 1986) . Although voter identification cards are sent out to registrants, there is no provision for investigating the validity of registrants with nondeliverable cards. Telephone interview with Margie Wade, Data Processing Supervisor, Kentucky states, the registrant whose non-forwardable card was returned must on election day sign an affidavit or take an oath swearing that she really does reside at the challenged address. Only upon completion of this additional procedure may the questioned individual cast a ballot."' Finally, some states, in addition to administering an oath or affidavit, will isolate the challenged ballot, leaving its validity to be resolved by investigation following the election. 102 Only this last group of states is in fact effectively using pre-election day registration as a means of flagging registrants with possibly fraudulent addresses before the election.
The fact that many states do not use registration as a verification tool to the degree theoretically possible supports the thesis that these states do not perceive fraud through registration to be a major problem. Systematic election fraud is more likely to be conducted by election officials than by private individuals, 0 3 and at the voting rather than registration stage. 104 Registration restrictions thus are ineffective means of combatting the more prevalent forms of voter fraud.
C. "Least Restrictive Means" Analysis
Judicial Authority
Courts have the authority to make a judgment concerning leastrestrictive means in the registration context. 1 0 5 In school desegregation, 0 6 mental hospital, 10 7 and prison0 1 cases, courts have directed states to com-ply with broad, detailed remedial plans. In reapportionment cases, courts have invalidated legislative districts with population disparities. 0 9 Similarly, a structural change may be needed with respect to voter registration in order to vindicate the individual rights implicated. The Supreme Court has never ruled that limiting state expenditures could be a compelling interest to which a remedial order must conform. 10 The decrees issued in the desegregation, mental hospital, and prison cases often had the effect of requiring states to reallocate funds and make large additional expenditures."' Such decrees have never been reversed on appeal specifically on the ground that compliance required undue state expenditure. Moreover, in the voting context, courts have required remedies that could only be implemented by increasing state expenditures. 1 2 Thus, courts can clearly issue decrees defining least restrictive means in the registration context, with the expectation that states will undertake the requisite effort and expense needed for compliance.
Least Restrictive Means in the Registration Context
The key question in least restrictive means analysis is whether there exist alternative procedures that could be followed on election day to accomplish the fraud prevention purpose for which a state is actually using pre-election day registration. If such procedures exist, a state could serve its compelling interest while removing the registration closing date burden on the individual voter. Election day registration would still permit states to undertake more verification measures than many currently do. Verification measures that could easily accompany election day registration include the following: First, the requirements to take an oath and sign one's signature carry both a psychological deterrent against falsity 13 and a legal deterrent in the form of penalties for perjury. Election day registration does remove the opportunity for election officials to compare signatures signed at two different times. It is still possible, though, to derive the psychological gain from requiring two sequential oaths, one upon registering and the second upon actually voting. Second, all election day registrants could be required to provide positive identification, such as a driver's license or utility bills, indicating the address the voter is claiming. Registrants who provide identification lacking an address or indicating an out of district address could be put immediately into a "challenged" category, to be included in the ballot count only upon subsequent verification of residency. Third, existing registered voters in the precinct could vouch for new registrants. Fourth, the currently common practice of requiring a voter to cast a ballot at only one designated polling site eliminates the possibility that an individual could use the same residence identification to vote at different polling sites. Thus, the procedural requirement that, regardless of where one registers, one must report to a designated polling place in order actually to vote serves as a concurrent check across jursidictions for multiple voters. Fifth, registrants could be advised upon registering that stiff penalties for providing fraudulent information will be enforced. Sixth, the role of both partisan and nonpartisan poll watchers could be enhanced; these poll watchers could challenge voters who they in good faith believe are providing fraudulent information.' 14 Sealed, marked ballots of challenged voters could be put in a separate box to be counted in the election results only once the identification provided is verified. The above procedures indicate that many alternative truth-inducing devices relied on in the registration process can be employed equally as well on election day.
In practice, states can be broken down into three categories regarding the feasibility of converting to an election day registration mechanism capable of countering fraud to the same degree as their current, pre-election 113. The psychological deterrent effect from taking an oath derives from the solemn circumstances under which it is administered, and the length of the oath. For further discussion of the psychological deterrent posed by a signature requirement, see The second category includes states that use the verification tool of cross checking registrant information within the state through centralized files. This task, however, could be accomplished equally well on election day.'" For example, several states already have computer systems that allow for rapid cross checking of registrant information throughout the state."' By simply expanding this type of system, information provided by election day registrants could be immediately cross checked against the state's files to confirm that no one with identicial identification is registered for another address in the state. This system of checking would be facilitated by requiring election day registrants to provide positive identification. Cost could be minimized if the computer terminals were installed only in specified locations at which the individual would obtain a certificate of registration that she would then carry on to her designated polling site." 1 9
115. Of course, states could move among these categories. For example, a state that began using non-forwardable postcards for fraud detection would move to category three, while a state that stopped using registration for any pre-election day fraud prevention purpose would move to category one. 117. Should these computer runs require more than instantaneous processing time, the registration deadline could be set just far enough in advance of the election to allow for processing time, such as 48 hours prior to election day.
118. In Kentucky, for example, local registrars input voter registration data directly into a statewide computer system. 119. In Wisconsin, for example, persons who register on election day must first properly execute a registration form at the municipal clerk's office before proceeding to cast a ballot at the polling place. Wis. STATr. ANN. § § 6.29, 6.55 (West 1986). This is a greater burden than allowing registra-The third set of states, those using non-forwardable postcards to identify false addresses, are using registration as a fraud detection device that cannot be duplicated by an election day mechanism. 120 These states still must pursue that interest in the manner least restrictive of the right to vote. The National Municipal League has proposed door-to-door canvassing as a mechanism by which, at little additional expense, states could continue to use registration for verification while minimizing the burden on individuals posed by registration. 2 Practices currently used in states more accommodating to registrants also suggest less restrictive means. For example, in Pennsylvania, registration forms are made available to those who apply for a driver's license, a library card, or admission to an institution of higher education.' 2 2 Rhode Island provides for annual registration drives at each high school.' 2 3 California has used a toll-free telephone number for registration.' Several states have recently established policies by which registration forms could be distributed through public agencies. 2 Utility companies could regularly include a registration form with materials sent to new customers signing up for utility service. These distribution schemes might be implemented either by deputizing some workers at the participating institutions or by permitting individuals to return the forms by mail. The cost of these mechanisms would be little more than the time required to train some employees to answer registrants' questions.
A state would not be relieved of its obligation to extend registration opportunites simply by demonstrating the use of some facilitative practices. It would be for courts to determine, case by case, the threshold at which anticipated fraud from a specific facilitative mechansim would justify the state in not implementing that particular mechanism. 126 While increasing registration opportunites does not eliminate the barrier completely, it may present the least restrictive means in states actually using pre-election day registration for fraud prevention.
III. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of the voter registration requirement should be challenged under the fundamental rights strand of equal protection analysis. Because registration itself is a restriction on the fundamental right to vote, strict scrutiny should be applied to any registration requirement. Of the various interests a state might assert, only the regulatory interest in fraud prevention could be both compelling and potentially appropriately addressed through registration. No form of pre-election day registration is necessary when states are not making use of registration as a means to combat voter fraud or if an alternative election day mechanism is available to accomplish the fraud prevention purpose for which the state is actually using its registration data. At a minimum, strict scrutiny requires states that are using the time interval between a registration deadline and the election to detect voter fraud to open up channels for registration, making it more likely that all qualified voters will be able to surmount the registration barrier. 126. A state that could demonstrate a larger fraud problem might for example need to implement costly safeguards, such as supervisors of volunteer registrars, as it opens up registration opportunities. Thus, a state with a more severe demonstrated fraud problem might have higher costs related to implementation of facilitative registration practices than states that could not justify the need for such safeguards.
